Monthly Archives: June 2005

Law

The Sale of Goods and Agency

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It’s been a while since I had an exam that was actually good, I was stressed this morning because I woke up so early and did not feel like studying at all, I went to the venue early as well and had to wait again, but this time chatting and laughing with some of my other friends. The exam questions were straight forward and I found a sufficient number of questions that I can answer, I am so bad at learning case names, so I didn’t put many of these, but otherwise I think that I did well, or that’s what I hope! I still have to use the same statutes book for Consumer Law.

Law

Duties of the Agent

This can actually fall below the previous post, but I thought that I should put in a separate one, that was already over a 1500 words… (Hmmmm, I could’ve wrote my essays in this speed if I really wanted to, I’ll try that next year! ;P)

Well, the duties of the agent could arise either from the agreement made between P+A whether a contract existed or not, or from the fiduciary nature of agency. Here comes a list of the various duties imposed upon the agent:

  1. To Obey Instructions
    If in a contract, failure would constitute a breach in that this was a failure to perform the contract. A must obey, even if he thinks that he would help P by disobeying, Case Bertram Armstrong and Co v Godfrey, A did not buy the shares as P instructed him because the thought their price would go higher, but instead they fell. (LOL), he was liable for the damages P incurred. (Stupid A)
  2. Care and Skill
    A must exercise care and skill when performing his duties. The precise degree of Care and Skill required will depend upon several factors including any expertise which A has expressely or impliedly claimed to have. If A was in a course of business this would arise because of s13 of SGA. If A was acting in a course of a business, this would arise under common law, if A was not under a contract he would liable in tort. This is the funnies case of all, Claudy v Parabhakr, a friend recommended a 2nd-hand car to ‘P’, she (P) to her friend that she wanted a car that has not been in an accident, A found a car that actually was in accident, but he thought that it’ll be good enough, so he bought the car for her. P discovered that the car was not roadworthy and A was liable even though he was a mere gratutious agent, he did not exercise C+S.
  3. Personal Perfromance
    A must perform personally and must not delegate his authority, but there are four exceptions: (1) when P expressly authorisese it, (2) when A can imply power to delegate from circusmtances, (3) delegation of an act requiring no skill + care, (4) the delegation became necessary due to unforeseen circumstances. Case McCanne & Co v Pow, A claimed to be a sole agent, P bought an estate through a subagent, he could not claim any commission.
  4. Fiduciary duties, these duties overlap, so breach of one can involve breach of another. (1) To avoid any conflict of interest, A must avoid a conflict between his own interst and those of his P. eg. buy for his p his own goods, except if he makes a full disclosure of this to P.(2) Not to make a secret profile: A must not make any profit other than that which has been agreed with P. eg, by using P’s property, his position of authority, or info or knoweldge which he had acquired in ths course of his agency. (3) Not to take a bribe, this does not necessarily indicate corruption in this context, a bribe is defined as a commission or other inducement which is given by a 3rdp to A as such and which is secret from P. If A does take a bribe P has the following remedies. (1) dismisses A and recover commission or salary paid to A. (2) Reover the bribe from either A or the person who paid it. (3) or alternatively regard the bribe as held on trust for P. (4) sue A or the person who paid the bribe for losses susained as a result of the bribe. (5)resice the contract made with the 3rdp. (4) The duty to account: A must keep his own prop separate from P’s. If A mixes them, P is entitled to the whole unless A can show what property belonged to him, he must also keep a record of dealing on P’s behalf, P can request to inspect.

To conclude, the “A” sounds very funny to me. Holes anyones?

Law

General Principles of Agency

This is another topic that I am doing for the module of The Sale of Goods and Agency, which I am having tomorrow at 9:00 AM. I am going to discuss the general principles regarding agency, and these are the ways in which an agency can bind his principal and the liabilities existing between the different parties involved in an agreement involving agency.

An agent is a person that can alter the legal position of another, namely, his principal. Usually a contract would govern their agreement, but that is not necessary as an agent could work gratuitously. For an agent to bind his principal he needs to acquire authority, there are four forms of acquired authority, these are actual, apparent, ratified, and agency of necessity.

Actual agency is one that results by the agreement of the minds of the principal and the agent, it could be express or implied. Express agency could be made orally or by the setting of a written agreement (contract), on the other hand, implied actual authority is one that the parties reached without words, it would usually arise from the P and A’s relationship to each other or from their conduct. Implied agency is usually supplemented with express authority as it can include everything that is reasonable incidental to the effective carrying out of the agency. An example of this is the case of Howard v Skeward where an estate agent would usually have the implied authority to warrant the soundness of the house being sold or any aspect of it. Implied authority can be excluded by P, but it must be communicated to the other party. What exactly is implied would depend on the field of agency, in the case of Bailey v Balhold Securities, brokers of sugar had the implied authority to trade nder their own name and hold extra liability as this was custom in this sector of agency. It is up to the court to decide the scope of the implied d authority, in the case of Sorrel v Finch, it was not part of the agent authority to accept deposit, if they did accept them this would do in their own right.

Apparent authority is unlike actual authority, it does NOT arise from the agreement between A + P, on the other hand, it arises on account of P’s having made a representation to a 3rd p that A has the authority to act on his behalf. This is in essence a form of estoppel. If P’s words or actions that give the impression that he has consented to a person acting as his agent, P may be estopped from the denying this once the 3rd p has acted upon this rep. This is based upon the notion of reliance, the requirements for apparent authority to kick in are:

  1. A representation that A has authority
  2. The rep must be made by P or someone on his behalf
  3. 3rd p must have relied on the rep.

The UK doctrine is more favorable to P than 3rd p’s as P would only be bound if he does something, while in the US they have another doctrine for inherit general authority under which A can create apparent authority.

The leading case on apparent authority is Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park Properties Ltd, where directors of the company allowed Kapoor to act as if he had been appointed a managing director of the company. They had given the impression that Kapoor had the power to bind the company, so the company was liable on the contract to the architects who had relied on this rep by making the contract.

Reliance is required for the doctrine to take effect, if the 3rdp knew either by A telling them that he has no authority or by any other way, there would be no reliance on the rep and P would not be bound by A’s action. Case Overbrooke Estates v Glencombe Prop Ltd.

Apparent authority could arise by several forms of conduct such as allowing A to have control over the premises, case Barrett v Deere where the 3rdp paid a debt to the main behind the counter who appeared to be P’s A. P was held liable. Another conduct would be the failure to communicate any limitation on A’s usual authority, the cases here are Freeman and Hely-Hutchinson again. It is also possible for the rep to be made after the conclusion of the contract, case Spiro v Lintern where the wife sold the house without authority, but later the husband said nothing with the buyer came.

In addition to actual and apparent authority, P can also confer authority on A retrospectively via the doctrine of ratification. When A acts without authority or in excess of his authority, but P later ratifies the contract, either expressly or impliedly, then he retrospectively confers actual authority on the agent. Upon ratification, both P and 3rd p’s will become contractually bound to each other. The main requirements are:

  1. A must have purported to act as an agent, the doctrine of undisclosed agency would NOT work with ratification. He does not have to name P, but he has to make it clear that he is an agent of someone. Keighley Maxted & Co v Durant , the partner bought without authority and without disclosure about partnership, ratification was failed.
  2. P must have had full capacity to make the contract both when A made the contract and when it was ratified. This is a very practical difficulty in relation to companies, but because of some law development it is now possible to bind a company that did not exist at the time of the contract.
  3. At the time of the ratification, P must know all the material details of the contract, or he must intend to ratify no matter what these details were. (Marsh v Joseph).
  4. A void contract cannot be ratified, this is important in relation to contracts with enemy aliens where you cannot legally enter into a contract with an enemy alien.
  5. Ratification must take place within a reasonable time and will not be allowed where a 3rdp have acquire property rights which would be adversely affected by ratification.
  6. Ratification must relate to the whole transaction not just a part of it.

Once a contract is successfully ratified then it is effective as if A had had actual authority tat the time the contract was made. (Bolton Partners v Lambert) 3rdp wanted to revoke the offer after ratification, but failed.

In addition to all these, the law could operate to establish agency, this is called “Agency of Necessity”. This is related to situations where agency is implied where one person acts to safeguard the property of another. Requirements:

  1. A must be in control of P’s property.
  2. It must be impossible to obtain P’s instructions.
  3. A real emergency must exist which made it necessary for A to act as he did.
  4. A must act in good faith.

OK, before we move on to the liabilities, it has to be mentioned that there is a sub-category of actual authority called undisclosed agency, where A does not disclose that he is an A. This is legal and will bind P under certain conditions… Anyway, lets move to the liability on contracts made by agents:

3rdp rights to sue on contract will depend on whether the agency was disclosed or not, under disclosed agency only P will be liable as A has made it clear that he did not intend to become personally liable. Under undisclosed agency, both A and P would be independently liable o the 3rd p, the 3rd p can choose who to sue, but once they make their mind, they cannot change their D. If A did not have any authority when he acted under undisclosed agency, then P cannot ratify it and A will be liable on his own.

P CANNOT sue under undisclosed agency in the following situations:

  1. The contract excludes agency
  2. 3rd p would have refused undisclosed P. Case Said v Butt – Play ticket, the critic was not allowed to buy through his friend.
  3. 3rd p made the contract because they wanted to contract with A himself. Geer v Downs Supply Co. 3rdp owed A a debt and wanted to have the difference paid through the new contract. But in the case of Dayster v Randall, 3rdp was not allowed to avoid the contract because the identity of the other party is not an essence of the transaction.
Law

Transfer of Title By a Non-Owner

The general rule of nemo dat says that one cannot give what he does not have. A person cannot transfer a title to another person if he never had one to start with. If a thief steals some article from one person, if another person buys that article from the thief he cannot legally own it because its title still belongs to the original owner. In most cases the question which arises is which of the two innocent people is to suffer the fraud of a third. Balance has to be made between the protection of property of the owner, and the protection of commercial transaction as the person who takes in good faith for value without notice should get a good title. For this reason many exception have developed to protect a buyer in good faith against the original owner.

The general rule is placed in s21(1) of the Sale of Goods Act: where goods are sold by a person who is not their owner, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell.

The general rule itself in s21 points out the first exception of the rule of nemo dat, if the seller himself by his conduct precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell a title can pass the buyer in goods faith. This is what we call an estoppel.

1 – Estoppel: There are two distinct cases where the owner is precluded from denying the seller’s authority to sell: (1) where by his words or conduct represented to the buyer that the seller is the true owner or has authority to sell. (Estoppel by representation). (2) Where the owner, by his failure to act, allows the seller to appear as the owner or as having the owner’s authority to sell. (Estoppel by negligence). For the exception to apply there must be an unambiguous representation of fact that was acted upon. And for estoppel by negligence, the buyer must be under some duty to correct the misstatement.

  • Estoppel by words: Case Henderson & Co v Williams – C Represented that F was the owner by ordering D to transfer the goods into his name in their books. C was estopped.
  • Estoppel by conduct: Case Eastern Distributors Ltd v Goldring - M signed and delivered forms to C which enabled C to represent that he had M’s authority to sell. M was estopped.
  • It is important to distinguish between representations that seller has authority to sell and those that make that represent the seller as the owner. If it was ostensible authority, he would only be authority to sell in the ordinary course of business, otherwise the true owner cannot be estopped. Case Motor Credits Ltd v Pacific Motor Auctions Pty Ltd The sale fell outside the ordinary course of because it took place in later hours and agreed to sell back on certain conditions. Estopped could not take place. In the other hand, if the seller had ostensible ownership it would not matter if it took place outside the ordinary course of dealing, unless if this can be a proof of lack of good faith. Case Lloyds and Scottish Finance Ltd v Williamson – did not sell in the course of business, but it did not matter.
  • Estoppel by negligence: This may be established where the owner of goods has by his negligence allowed a 3rd party to represent himself as owner or as having the owner’s authority to sell. The application of this estoppel is limited by the requirement of a duty to take care. Case Coventry Shepherd & Co v Great Eastern Rly Co - D negligently issued 2 delivery orders relating to the same load of goods; was estopped. Case Mercantile Credit Co V Hamblin The dealer cheated, but the original owner was not negligent by trusting the dealer. IMPORTANT CASE: Moorgate Mercantile Co Ltd v Twitchings - Failure to register with HPI did not ive rise to an estoppel by negligence as there was no duty to D to register with HPI. {In this case the guy got the car on HP then sold it back, the 2nd buyer checked with HPI and it said that this car was not registered with them, original owner still got the car back} Moral of the story: A duty must exist for someone to be negligent.

2 – The second exception: S2 of the Factors Act, Sale by a mercantile agent, this exception applies where a mercantile agent is, with the consent of the owner, in possession of goods or documents of title to goods, any sale, pledge, or other disposition of the goods, made by him when acting in the ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent, shall, subject to the provisions of this act, be as valid as if he were expressly authorise by the owner of the goods to make the same, provided that the person taking under the disposition acts in good faith, and has not at the time of the disposition noticed that the person making the disposition has no authority to make the same.

This section of the act has to be examined in great detail, a mercantile agent is defined in the act, he is a sales agent or some agent that can raise money on the security of goods. He can work exclusively for P, but has to be more than a mere employee. “A” must be in possession ‘at the time of the sale, etc’, not at the time when the buyers saw the goods, case Beverly Acceptances v Oakley > Possession has long ended at the time of the sale. The possession of the goods must be with the consent of the owner, a trick will not work (I think) the case is Pearson v Rose & Young, they took the logbook of the car by some trick. The goods must be entrusted to the agent for the purpose of the agency in that it must be connected wit the business somehow. The sale must be in the ordinary course of business, this is a question of fact, and it involves the facts that might make the 3rd p think that something is wrong with the transaction, eg. outside work hours, outside premises. Finally, the buyer must act in goods faith and without notice that the sale was made without authority.

3 – Sales under a voidable contract (s23). Under this exception a voidable title that has not been avoided yet could be transferred to a buyer that did not know about the deficiency of the title. If a contract is voidable, but sold before recession, then this would be ‘a bar to recession’ and the 3rd party would have good title. The key question here is whether the contract is void for a fundamental mistake or merely voidable (usually for fraud). The second part of the exception is related to the owner actually rescinding the contract. Recession is a ‘self-help’ remedy for there are no formal procedures required. The only requirement to rescind is the unambiguous intention to rescind communicated to the other party, which is almost impossible to accomplish if you cannot find the buyer if he is deliberately hiding. An important case in this topic is Car & Universal Finance v Caldwell, where the court held that the contract was rescinded even though the seller did not communicate to the other party, in this case the seller instantly went to the police when he discovered that the check was invalid and also went to RAC/AA. Court said that the contract is rescinded if all possible procedures were done. These means that you don’t have to communicate to the other party if the other party this to hid and you have done everything possible. This decision was not followed in Scotland and a report on transfer of title suggested reversing the rule.

4 – Seller in Possession (s24) – basically, a seller who is possession of the goods that he sold, can sell them again to a 2nd buyer and that buyer can acquire a good title if he received them in good faith and without notice of the first sale.

The change in the seller’s legal capacity does not matter now, what matter is the physical possession, case Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering.

Delivery no longer has to be actual, it can be constructive by keeping the physical possession unaltered and merely transferring the right to possession?

5 – Buyer in Possession (s25) – This exception allows a buyer who possesses the goods to successfully pass a good title to a 2nd buyer if he delivers to the goods to the 2nd buyer and the buyers receives the goods in good faith and without notice.

The first transaction between S and B1 has to be a contract of a sale, not a a sale or return transaction nor a HP transaction. The goods must be with the buyer with consent from the seller, it does not matter if he acquired the goods by a criminal offence as long as the owner consented and does not matter if the owner revoked his consent later. Another requirement is that the buyer must obtain possession of the goods or the documents of title to the goods. Constructive possession is sufficient here if the first buyer requested the seller to deliver the goods directly to the 2nd buyer. Also, the nature of the possession does not matter even temporary would suffice (Marten v Whale) . It also seems possible for delivery to take place in an undivded bulk, although it would seem to conlict with the s16 which does not permit a transfer of property in an undivded bulk of goods except in the circumstances set out in s20 inserted by the 1995 Act.

The 3rd p must take the goods in gooth faith and without notice, and notice here has its usual commercial meaning, which is actual and not constructive. The capacity at which the buyer obtains control of the goods does not matter, provided it is with the consent of the owner, but if the buyer acquires documets of title and not the goods, the seller may have a lien on the goods themselves, but how can this happen if the buyer has ‘possession’?

The difference between s8 and s9, is that s8 makes the seller transfer the title as if he was the owner, while the s9 makes the 1st buyer transfer the goods as if he was a mercantile agent acting for the owner. A mercantile agent can only pass a good title if done in the course of a business. In Lambert v G&C Finance Corporation Ltd, the guy sold the car without the log book, the court said that this was no in the course of a business, so the section did not apply. Under s9, if the first seller is not an owner the section will not apply, because CONSENT is required for the section to apply.

6 – Part 3 of the Hire Purchase Act 1964 - Under this exception a bona fide purchaser for value of a motor vehicle from a person in possession under a hire-purchase agreement or a conditional sale agreement obtains a good title. The only limitation is that it does not apply to a ‘trade or finance purchaser’. This is defined in the act as a person carrying some car business (it is actually something specific in the act), any other trader can rely on the exception. A car trader will not be protected even if he bought the car for his own use, (Stevenson v Beverly Benticle Ltd).

This section can also protect a new hirer, eg. S1 > HP > B1 > HP > B2. This is because HP is ‘another disposition’. The section requires the first agreement to be an HP agrement (NOT NORMAL HIRE), there is no requirement for possession under the agreement, but there must be a disposition by the hirer or the buyer. (The definition of possession is exhausted under this exception). The buyer must also act in good faith and without notice of the HP or the conditional sale agreement.

The onus of proof is on hte purchaser to prove that he bought the car in good faith (Barker v Bell) and wihtout notice, if he succeeds, the HP company might want to show that B1 was not a purchaser in good faith, so that no title can pass from the start, or it might want to claim that the car was not disposed by the hirer at all, but was, for example, stolen from him, or was disposed by someone else.